It has been hypothesized that our believing that, or its seeming to us as though, the world is in some way dynamical partially explains (and perhaps rationalizes) future-bias. Recent work has, in turn, found a correlation between future-bias and near-bias, suggesting that there is a common explanation for both. Call the claim that what partially explains our being both future- and near-biased is our believing/it seeming to us as though the world is dynamical, the dynamical explanation. We empirically test two (...) versions of the dynamical explanation. The first is the moving ego explanation—according to which it is our belief that the ego moves, or our phenomenology as of the ego moving, that jointly (partially) explains future- and near-bias. The second is the moving time explanation—according to which it is our belief that time robustly passes, or our phenomenology as of robust passage, which jointly (partially) explain future- and near-bias. We found no evidence in favour of either explanation. (shrink)

Extreme conditions like savantism, autism or synaesthesia, which have a neurological 2AH, UK basis, challenge the idea that other minds are similar to our own. In this paper we report a single case study of a man in whom all three of these conditions co-occur. We suggest, on the basis of this single case, that when savantism and synaesthesia co- occur, it is worthwhile testing for an undiagnosed Autism Spectrum Condition (ASC). This is because savantism has an established association with (...) ASC, and the combination of ASC with synaesthesia may increase the likelihood of savantism. The implications of these conditions for philosophy of mind are introduced. (shrink)

Over recent years, lawyer misconduct and regulation of the profession have been topics of considerable interest. Yet, when the topic of legal ethics is raised, the focus tends to be on lawyer conduct external to the firm: lawyer conduct in court; lawyer conduct vis-a-vis client; or lawyer conduct vis-a-vis opposing counsel or the judiciary. The recent National Attrition and Re-engagement Study, however, raises a different aspect of legal professional ethics. This Report found a widespread incidence of bullying, intimidation, discrimination and (...) harassment within law firms, primarily affecting though not confined to, female lawyers. Of course, bullying and associated behaviours are not confined to the legal profession. But these behaviours are at odds with a profession that purports to be deeply concerned with the ethical conduct of its members. Arguing that ‘ethics begins at home’, this paper suggests NARS raises uncomfortable questions about legal professional ethics: if law firms cannot treat their own staff members ethically, what does that say about the firm’s approach to ethical conduct more generally? And if this culture is as widespread as the report suggests, what does this say about the ethics of the legal profession as a whole? (shrink)

On a voulu montrer dans ce livre que, reflete a travers les miroirs differents que sont les genies philosophiques et politiques de l'epoque, l'idealisme allemand forme une incontestable unite de langage philosophique. A l'interieur de cette grande unite, ou la philosophie ne cesse de se confronter aux plus hauts problemes de l'homme, le clivage entre un idealisme transcendantal et l'idealisme speculatif apparait comme une faille profonde, en ce que la description de la finitude humaine, et par consequent la comprehension des (...) limites de l'homme, est l'objet du premier alors que le rapport d'expression du fini a l'infini est au coeur du second. L'attitude idealiste symbolisee par Hegel a eu de nombreuses consequences. Mais les critiques qui ont ete faites aux successeurs de Hegel ne doivent pas nous faire oublier la presence de l'idealisme allemand. C'est cette presence philosophique que ce livre espere restituer. (shrink)

According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation. I defend my view from objections, including C. D. Broad's influential “timing” argument, and I (...) conclude with implications for agent‐causal theories of free will. (shrink)

C'est la double dimension de la religion que Bergson souligne : magie et superstition d'un côté, force de progrès moral et d'amour de l'autre. Le souci de l'élan spirituel des mystiques est très précoce et commence dès le début du siècle, au plus tard en 1905. Le caractère exceptionnel de l'expérience mystique intéresse Bergson qui y voit un signe de valeur. L'émotion créatrice et la réflexion philosophique partagent avec l'expérience mystique une énergie morale qui n'est pas pure contemplation ni pure (...) spéculation, mais qui fait avancer l'humanité vers la joie d'accomplir sa destinée. Bergson stresses the twofold dimension of religion : i.e. magic and superstition on the one hand, and strenght of moral progress and of love, on the other. Bergson's interest in the spiritual surge of the mystics starts as early as the beginning of the century, anyhow not later than 1905. Bergson finds the exceptional characteristic of the mystical experience interesting because he sees in it a sign of worth. Both the creative emotion and philosophical reflection share with the mystical experience a moral energy which is neither a mere contemplation nor a mere speculation, but, rather, enables humanity to move one step forward towards achieving its fate. (shrink)

Le symbolisme naît à partir du langage quand l'homme prend conscience qu'il est un être irrémédiablement clivé entre nature et culture, conscient et inconscient, masculinité et féminité, idéal du moi et moi idéal ; une sorte d'animal dénaturé à la recherche d'une unité perdue, que lui prête, provisoirement et superficiellement, le symbolique, ce lieu où il tente de "recoller les morceaux", c'est-à-dire retrouver le monde du prénatal, de l'amniotique qui était le Un et pas encore le Deux. Le symbolisme serait-il (...) la marche vers un Principe unificateur, comme le pense l'Eglise catholique, ou la prise de conscience et l'acceptation d'une vacuité lucide comme le suggère la psychanalyse...? (shrink)

Le cahier de notes de Schelling sur ses lectures de l'année 1809 peut être confronté avec l'agenda de Schelling de la même année. Il s'avère que des nombreuses lectures sur le problème du mal précèdent et suivent immédiatement la publication des Recherches sur la liberté humaine. La lecture de Jacob Böhme y est attestée; mais il s'agit d'une présentation populaire de la doctrine de Böhme. En fait, l'ouvrage annoté par Schelling est un gros opuscule intitulé Hirtenbrief an die wahren und (...) ächten Freymäurer alten Systems, anonyme paru en 1785, dont le contenu est une « mise en système » de la doctrine de Böhme, c'est-à-dire une rationalisation stricte de cette philosophie. Schelling, lisant cet opuscule en a supprimé tout élément proprement théosophique pour ne garder que le côté spéculatif, sans référence précise à la révélation chrétienne. Il n'y a encore aucune christologie chez Schelling, alors même qu'est présent le schème de la connexion de la liberté et du mal. Le mal est un moment nécessaire de la création car, sans lui, Dieu ne pourrait se manifester. Le mal est colère de Dieu, souffrance et maladie; il n'est pas voulu par l'homme, mais il est le révélateur de la triste mélancolie de l'existence créée. The Notebook of Schelling concerning his readings in the year 1809 is to be compared with the diary of Schelling in the same year. A number of readings about the problem of evil precedes and succeeds the publication of Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809). The reading of Jacob Böhme is attested in this Notebook; but it is a popular presentation of the boehmist doctrine. It is a fact that Schelling annotated a big opuscule called Hirtenbrief an die wahren und ächten Freymäurer alten Systems, anonymously published in 1785; the contents of this book is a systematisation of the boehmist doctrine, a strict rationalisation of this philosophy. Schelling, studying this opuscule, has suppressed any elements specifically theosophic, and has retained only the speculative elements without any references to the Christian Revelation. There is not yet any christology in Schellingian thinking, even if the scheme of the connexion of liberty and evil is present. Evil is a necessary moment in the Creation, because without it God cannot reveal himself. The evil is the anger of God, suffering and illness; it does not proceed from the man, but it reveals the unhappy melancoly of the created existence. (shrink)

Avec les travaux de Boutroux (1845-1921), une nouvelle page est tournée dans la pratique de l’histoire de la philosophie comme exercice de la pensée philosophique : une histoire philosophante de la philosophie. Notre façon de faire de l’histoire de la philosophie, en citant les textes, en les situant, en analysant la structure des œuvres, en suivant les raisonnements pas à pas, lui est redevable. Ce n’est pas dans la critique qu’il est le meilleur, c’est dans la sympathie, voire dans la (...) communion intellectuelle. Sa méthode est intuitive : il fait le portrait d’un penseur et montre les fils directeurs de son œuvre. Ainsi pour Aristote, Böhme, Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz. (shrink)

Les trois études qui sont ici rassemblées, à l’occasion du bicentenaire de la Phénoménologie de l’esprit, sont le fruit d’une collaboration effective, visant à dégager les différents niveaux de la vie dans l’œuvre de Hegel. Chez ce grand penseur, tout va en effet par niveaux de réalité. La vie est d’abord organique ou biologique (c’est..

Windelband, réputé comme chef de l'école néokantienne de Bade, s'oppose comme Bergson au relativisme et au positivisme. Pour lui, comprendre Kant, c'est le dépasser, et ce, dans la direction de Hegel ; lire Bergson, c'est retrouver le sens de l' événement dans une métaphysique de l'irrépétable, qui, en montrant l'insuffisance du criticisme, ouvre la porte aux sciences historiques. Cela est l'interprétation positive de Bergson. Mais la critique est qu'il faut séparer totalement la psychologie de la philosophie, contrairement à la tradition (...) philosophique française, encore observée par Bergson. Mais le volontarisme bergsonien apparaît comme représentatif de l'esprit de la philosophie du tournant du XIXe au XXe siècle. Mieux encore, avec Bergson, la philosophie retrouve l'ambition d'être une vision globale du monde. Windelband, well-known for being the leader of the Neo-Kantian School of Bade, together with Bergson, is opposed to both relativism and positivism. According to him, understanding Kant means going further than the latter and, more, in Hegel's direction. Reading Bergson means finding again the meaning of event within metaphysics of what may not be repeated which, by showing the insufficiency of criticism, opens a new way towards historical sciences. Such is the positivie interpretation of Bergson. But the criticism is such as one should imperatively separate psychology from philosophy, contrary to the French philosophical tradition, still observed by Bergson. But Bergsonian voluntarism appears as some kind of representative of the spirit of philosophy at the turn of the 19th-20th century. Better further, with Bergson philosophy recaptures its ambition to become a global vision of the world. (shrink)

De la liaison de Charles VII et Agnès Sorel naissent quatre filles, dont trois atteignent l’âge adulte. L’une d’elles, Marie, épouse Olivier de Coëtivy, conseiller de Charles VII. Le couple et trois de leurs enfants ont laissé de nombreux manuscrits richement enluminés, témoins de leur bibliophilie mais aussi du regard porté sur la bâtardise de Marie de Valois par chaque membre de la famille. On découvre à travers les images de ces livres que l’identité bâtarde, dans les milieux de la (...) haute aristocratie et de la royauté, est davantage un honneur qu’un stigmate, comme cela a déjà été démontré, mais plus encore : elle peut faire l’objet d’une commémoration et d’une célébration au-delà de la génération bâtarde, comme c’est le cas dans la Légende dorée de Catherine de Coëtivy et de son mari, dont il sera amplement question. Cet article propose de prolonger la réflexion sur la bâtardise aristocratique selon deux perspectives peu traitées : celle du genre, à travers un exemple de bâtardise féminine et les dynamiques conjugales, et celle de la « mémoire bâtarde » aux générations ultérieures. (shrink)

Littérature et philosophie entretiennent des rapports évidents, du fait que certains philosophes sont poètes, comme Lucrèce, ou écrivains, comme Montaigne. On examine deux cas, Martha Nussbaum, qui soutient que la littérature, en particulier le roman, peut induire des analyses morales bien supérieures à celles des philosophes, et Maria Zambrano, philosophe et poète, qui soutient que c'est le même Logos qui est à l'oeuvre dans les deux domaines. Par le style, et par le souci conjoint de la signification, la poésie a (...) un sens philosophique. L'histoire de la pensée ne peut pas négliger le rôle eminent de la poésie philosophique à travers l'histoire : Chateaubriand, Paul Valéry, Paul Claudel ont accompli une œuvre littéraire d'une grande portée philosophique. Literature and philosophy keep obvious relationships since a few philosophers are poets too, such as Lucretius, or writers, as Montaigne. Here we examine two cases: on the one hand that of Martha Nussbaum, who supports that only literature, in particular the novel, can lead to moral analyses much superior to those of the philosophers, and, on the other hand, that of Maria Zambrano, both a philosopher and a poet, who supports that it is the same Logos which is at stake in both fields. By the style, and through the joint concern of meaning, the poetry has a philosophical meaning. The history of thought cannot neglect the prominent part played by philosophical poetry throughout history: Chateaubriand, Paul Valéry, Paul Claudel carried out a literary work of a long lasting philosophical range. (shrink)

La société contemporaine est constamment confrontée aux problèmes religieux. Cependant, la tradition républicaine française abandonne la religion à la sphère privée, comme si elle n'avait pas, par essence, une existence dans la Cité. Il ne s'agit pas pour autant de réduire la religion à sa dimension politique, voire au militantisme fanatique. La critique des réductions illégitimes de la religion est donc la première tâche. Il est aussi impossible de privatiser la religion que de la politiser. La réduire au lien social (...) n'est pas plus satisfaisant, même si c'est une tentation des sociologues. La religion ne se réduit pas davantage à la religiosité du sublime ou de l'idéal démocratique. Contre la notion scabreuse de " religions sans Dieu ", il vaut mieux admettre qu'il existe du religieux diffus sans religion, et garder le terme pour désigner une relation à la transcendance divine (une ou multiple) à la fois et indissolublement singulière et collective. Ainsi, il n'y a pas de religion sans prière individuelle, contrairement à ce que Kant souhaitait. Mais cette prière n'a aucun sens si elle ne s'adosse pas à un message intersubjectif, celui d'une communauté inspirée qui s'inscrit dans la Cité par sa dimension sociale et son histoire. La dimension personnelle de la religion (foi et méditation) s'appuie donc sur le symbolique, le témoignage et la communauté. Pour le philosophe d'aujourd'hui, les religions se présentent comme l'attestation multiple de la présence d'une transcendance divine et d'une vie spirituelle dans la société et dans l'histoire. Mettre la religion entre parenthèses, c'est s'exposer à ne rien comprendre de l'histoire du monde. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:25 MORALITY AS A BACK-UP SYSTEM: HUME'S VIEW? The sense of duty is a useful device for helping men to do what a really good man would do without a sense of duty..... Nowell-Smith A certain picture of morality — arguably a Humean one — has come to have a prominent place in contemporary philosophy. On this picture, morality, as Richard Brandt asserts, is "a back-up system, which operates (...) when spontaneous personal caring fails 2 to motivate us to do as we ought." Morality — at least in the form of moral principles, whose force is felt through one's sense of duty — is, on this view, ideally superfluous. As a guide for one's own conduct it is needed only insofar as the agent's affective network is deficient. If one only spontaneously desired a, cared about b, cared for c, felt aversion towards d as, ideally, one should, moral principles and a sense of duty would be of no use. There are good reasons for supposing that this is Hume's view. After all, his characterization of acting from duty is more than a little disparaging: When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that motive, may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself,,as much as possible, his want of it. I will argue, however, that there is tension in Hume's ethics between two lines of thought. According to the first line of thought, and the one 26 usually associated with Hume, good conduct is conduct which is spontaneously prompted by virtuous desires. Unless our desires either are not what they should be or are motivationally weak, there is no need for mediation or tempering by a sense of duty or moral principles. According to the second line, the very good desires of a very good person may nonetheless need to be filtered, tempered, redirected or checked. This line is most evident in "Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices." Before arguing that these strains of thought are in tension in Hume's ethics, I need to clarify what is at issue and to develop the two competing pictures of moral motivation. First the issue. The issue is not 'Who is better: someone with a sense of duty but corrupt desires or someone with no sense of duty but ideal desires?' Nor is the issue one of the moral worth of actions ('Can an action have moral worth if it is not performed out of duty?') The issue, rather, is how to characterize morally good (or right) conduct. What role, if any, does a sense of duty or a Butlerian principle of reflection, i.e., an overarching, guiding conception of what is right or good which is 'juridically' supreme within the self, play in good conduct? Is morally good conduct ideally a matter of acting as one should from the proper desires? Or should the desires be governed and guided by moral principles? Consider two models of moral conduct. Model I: Morality as a Back-Up System On this picture, wrongness in conduct is traceable to an affective deficiency. The claim underlying this picture seems to be as follows: One 27 acts wrongly because one's passions are not quite what they should be. One person cheats in her business dealings because she cares too little about the welfare of others (and too much about her own); another is harsh and abrupt to a student because he cares too little about his students' concerns and is jealous and possessive when it comes to 'his time.' In each case the problem can be traced to an affective deficiency. Hume appears to be supporting this view when he asserts, "it may be establish'd as an undoubted maxim, that no act can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from a sense of its morality' (T 479). A few pages later he writes, "[E]very immorality... (shrink)

" J'en connais à qui quand je demande ce qu'il sait, il me demande un livre pour me le montrer ; et il n'oserait me dire qu'il a le derrière galeux, s'il ne va sur le champ étudier en son lexicon, ce que c'est que galeux et ce que c'est que le derrière. Quand bien nous pourrions être savants du savoir d'autrui, au moins sages ne pouvons-nous être que de notre propre sagesse. " Montaigne, Essais, I, XXV, Du pédantisme.

Focusing primarily on papers and books discussing the evolutionary and systematic interpretation of the Cambrian animal fossils from the Burgess Shale fauna, this paper explores the role of epistemic values in the context of a discipline striving to establish scientific authority within a larger domain of epistemic problems and issues . The focal point of this analysis is the repeated claims by paleontologists that the study of fossils gives their discipline a unique ‘historical dimension’ that makes it possible for them (...) to unravel important aspects of evolution invisible to scientists who study the extant biosphere. The first part of the paper explores the shifting of emphasis in the writings of paleontologists between two strategies that employ opposing views on the classical positivist and physicalist ideal of science. The second part analyzes paleontologists’ claims of privileged access to life’s historical dimension in a situation where a theoretical upheaval occurring independent of the epistemical problem at hand completely shifts the standards for evaluating the legitimacy of various knowledge claims. Though the various strategies employed in defending the privileged historical perspective of paleontology have been disparate and, to an extent contradictory, each impinges on the acceptance of a specific epistemic ideal or set of values and success or failure of each depends on the compatibility of this ideal with the surrounding community of scientists. (shrink)

Le sens tragique de la vie de l'Esprit chez Hegel implique deux modalités de la vie : une vie sans tragique, qui n'est pas encore la vie spirituelle, et une vie tragique, qui implique la vie éthique. Le tragique est ce qui dissout la pseudo-unité de la nature et de la moralité chez la belle âme. Il s'incarne d'abord dans la tragédie et la tension entre les humains et les dieux, mais la comédie révèle que cette tragédie n'est pas la (...) tragédie absolue, laquelle appartient à la religion révélée, en tant que tragédie de Dieu même, la Passion du Christ étant la tragédie absolue. La forte insistance de Hegel sur l'opposition du Bien et du Mal justifie la mort volontaire du Dieu -homme, l'intériorisation dans la conscience de soi du Mal existant et naturel. C'est dans l'Esprit de la communauté que la mort du Médiateur devient la douleur de la conscience malheureuse. L'histoire de l'Absolu, en tant qu'elle est conçue, devient philosophie, mais, en tant qu'elle est vécue, elle est et reste une tragédie. The tragical meaning of Hegel's life of the Spirit implies two modalities of life : i.e. a life devoid of the tragic, which is not yet a spiritual life and a tragical life which implies ethical life. The tragic is what dissolves the pseudo-unity of nature and morality with the beautiful soul. It first embodies itself within tragedy and the tension between gods and human beings but comedy reveals that such a tragedy is no absolute tragedy, the latter belonging to revealed religion as being the very tragedy of God himself, Christ's passion being the absolute tragedy. The strong instance made by Hegel on the opposition between Good and Evil accounts and justifies the voluntary death of God-Man, the interiorization within self consciousness of existing and natural Evil. It is within the spirit of the community that the Mediator's death becomes the pain of unhappy conscience. The history of the Absolute, conceived as it is, becomes true philosophy, but so long as it becomes experienced, turns out to be and remains tragedy. (shrink)

Malebranche ne dissocie jamais la théorie et la pratique. Son Traité de morale est une œuvre métaphysique. Ceci a sa raison dans les rapports entre la foi et la raison qui sont complémentaires. Le rapport de l'âme et de l'amour, conformément à une tradition platonicienne, est un lieu où l'on peut vérifier cette connexion. L'analyse de l'âme met en évidence la modernité de Malebranche dans sa conception de la conscience ou sentiment intérieur, où se révèle l'irréductibilité du sensible. L'amour est (...) au sommet de l'âme, en ce qu'il coïncide avec la volonté du bonheur. En ce sens la théorie païenne est juste: une volonté aveugle et un amour d'instinct s'équivalent. Mais la liberté est le don du Dieu chrétien à l'homme. Avec la liberté seulement, un amour-propre déréglé est possible et pécheur. Inversement, le véritable amour, celui où l'âme se reconnaît elle-même, c'est la charité, qui est une sainte concupiscence; celle-ci est capable de nous inspirer le désir du vrai. L'amour de la vérité qui illumine l'âme est le sentiment qui reconnaît Dieu comme la souveraine Raison. (shrink)

De Reuchlin a Kleuker, Platon est interprete comme le grand philosophe heritier de la sagesse traditionnelle issue de la Kabbale ou des Chaldeens. Ce n'est qu'a partir de la seconde moitie du XVIIIe siecle que commence une interpretation plus rationaliste de Platon, avec Hegel et Schelling. Cette interpretation implique un platonisme de fait, c'est-a-dire une assimilation de Platon a l'interieur d'une demarche philosophique nouvelle. Elle s'inscrit dans le cadre d'une nostalgie de la Grece, a la base de la reflexion politique (...) et metaphysique du jeune Hegel. La derniere partie de l'ouvrage montre la persistance de grands philosophemes platoniciens a l'epoque moderne. A travers la question des correspondances et des harmoniques entre l'ame, le monde et Dieu, se revele la grande interrogation suivante: comment penser le platonisme selon la mobilite et sans reference a une philosophie de la substance et de l'immuabilite? (shrink)

Mein Beitrag untersucht die folgende Fragestellung: „Kann S gerechtfertigt sein, X zu tun, wobei es erlaubt ist, X zu tun, wenn die Bedingungen B vorliegen, wenn S fälschlich, aber vernünftigerweise glaubt, dass die Bedingungen B vorliegen?“ Ich plädiere für eine Bejahung dieser Frage, und zwar im Gegensatz zu der von Joachim Hruschka in seinem Aufsatz „Justifications and Excuses: A Sy-stematic Approach“ vertretenen Posi-tion. Ich bin der Auffassung, daß eine Rechtfertigung eine vernünftige Annahme voraussetzt; es ist nicht notwendig, daß diese Annahme (...) auch zutrifft. Dass S vernünftigerweise glaubt, daß p, während in Wirklichkeit p nicht vorliegt, scheint jedenfalls kein entschuldigender Umstand zu sein. Diese Situation ist vielmehr wesentlich unterschieden von krankheitsbedingter Zurechnungsunfähigkeit oder sonst verminderter geistiger Fähigkeit. Es ist daher wichtig, zwischen zwei Arten von Gründen zu unterscheiden, die dazu führen, daß eine Person nicht verantwortlich gemacht wird für X, obwohl sie X getan hat; und zwar sind dies einerseits Gründe, die im Hinblick auf Probleme der handelnden Person selbst entschuldigend wirken, und andererseits solche Gründe, die weder einen Mangel noch Verwirrung der handelnden Person selbst reflektieren, noch einen Fehler in dem Entscheidungsprozeß, der zu der Handlung geführt hat. My essay addresses the following question: "Can S be justified in doing X, where it is permissible to do X when conditions C obtain, if S mistakenly but reasonably believes that conditions C do obtain?" I defend an affirmative reply, contrary to the position taken by Prof. Hruschka in his "Justifications and Excuses: A Systematic Approach" . I understand justification as requiring reasonable belief; it is not necessary that the belief be true. That S believes on reasonable grounds that p when in fact p is false seems not to be an excusing condition. It is importantly different from insanity, or diminished capacity. I stress the importance of differentiating between two very different kinds of reasons for holding someone not to be culpable for X despite having done X, viz, reasons that exculpate due to problems with the agent himself and those that do not reflect any deficiency or disorder in the agent, or any flaw in the process by which she chose as she did. (shrink)

Penseurs du temps, Hegel et Bergson ont néanmoins élaboré un concept d’éternité paradoxal, en ce sens qu’il s’agit d’une éternité vivante, dynamique. Un renversement du platonisme s’opère dès lors qu’on veut penser l’éternité à partir du temps et non l’inverse. Chez Hegel, l’éternité signifie la circularité systématique d’une part, la présence éternelle de l’Idée dans la profondeur du présent, d’autre part. Mais Hegel résiste à l’éternisation logique qui ferait retomber l’esprit dans l’abstraction. Chez Bergson, la durée est la réalité même, (...) et l’opposition à la philosophie sub specie æternitatis de Spinoza est radicale. Cependant la durée s’exprime dans la joie créatrice, profonde et divine, qui n’est certes pas un retour à l’éternité platonicienne immuable, mais indique une autre éternité. C’est l’éternité de vie, autrement dit l’absolu en lequel nous vivons, nous nous mouvons et nous sommes.Bergson und Hegel konstituierten, als Denker der Zeit, einen paradoxen Begriff der Ewigkeit, das heit eine lebendige dynamische Ewigkeit. Eine Umkehrung des Platonismus findet statt, indem man die Ewigkeit aus der Zeit ohne vice versa denken will. In den Werken Hegels bedeutet die Ewigkeit teils die systematische Kreisförmigkeit und teils die ewige Präsenz der Idee in der Tiefgründlichkeit der Gegenwart. Hegel widerstrebt doch dem logischen Ewigmachen, mit dem der Geist in die Abstraktion senken konnte. In dem Denken Bergsons ist die Dauer die Wirklichkeit selbst, und der Gegensatz gegen die Philosophie sub specie æternitatis von Spinoza ist gründlich. Doch spricht sich die Dauer in die schöpferische göttliche tiefe Lust aus, die kein Rückkehr in die platonische unwandelbare Ewigkeit, sondern die eine andere Ewigkeit bedeutet. Diese ist die Ewigkeit des Lebens, das heit das Absolute, in dem wir leben, uns bewegen und sind. (shrink)

Medical assistance in dying (MAiD) was legalized in Canada in 2016. Canadians’ opinions on the service are nuanced, particularly as the legislation changes over time. In this paper, we outline findings from our review of representations of MAiD in Canadian news media texts since its legalization. These stories reflect the concerns, priorities, and experiences of key stakeholders and function pedagogically, shaping public opinion about MAiD. We discuss this review of Canadian news media on MAiD, provide examples of four key themes (...) we identified (vulnerability, autonomy, dignity, and human rights), and discuss their implications for health policy and equity. Though key stakeholders share the values of autonomy, dignity, and human rights, they appeal to them in diverse ways, sometimes with conflicting policy demands. These representations offer a useful gauge of how views about MAiD continue to shift alongside changes in federal legislation. These stories can influence related policies, respond to the powerful voices that shape MAiD legislation, and have the potential to change national conversations. Our analysis adds to the existing body of scholarship on MAiD by examining post-Bill C-7 news media, identifying related health equity issues and tensions, and discussing potential impacts of MAiD’s representations in news media. (shrink)

El libro que reseñaremos a continuación fue publicado en el año 2003 como primer número de la colección Thesys de la Editorial de la Universidad Católica de Córdoba, Argentina. Una pequeña nota en la contrasolapa nos informa que estamos, con esta colección, delante de “...una selección de obras de múltiples disciplinas, elaboradas a partir de los trabajos de Tesis de posgrado, presentadas y defendidas públicamente por docentes e investigadores de la U.C. de Córdoba., en distintas institucione..

Dans le domaine de l’éducation, le partenariat recherche-pratique consiste en l’établissement d’une collaboration fréquente et à long terme entre des praticiens et des chercheurs autour d’objectifs conjointement définis. Le but de cet article est de présenter un état des connaissances sur la façon dont un tel partenariat émerge et se conçoit, à partir d’une recension d’articles publiés sur cette question entre 2010 et 2020. La recension a été articulée selon trois niveaux d’analyse : a) individuel ; b) collectif ; et (...) c) administratif, gouvernance et communauté externe. Un des principaux constats mis en lumière concerne l’influence des éléments du niveau individuel, tel que la relation de confiance, sur certains éléments du niveau collectif, dont la composition et l’organisation des équipes de chercheurs et de praticiens. Il ressort de cette étude que la qualité de la relation de confiance entre les praticiens et les chercheurs peut influencer ou moduler les rôles que les uns et les autres joueront au sein de l’équipe, ainsi que leur engagement. Des pistes de recherche sont aussi présentées. (shrink)

Newman’s defense of the role of the laity in the development of doctrine not only occasioned a negative reaction from the Vatican, it had continued reverberations among his followers.This essay examines Newman’s influence on Baron Friedrich von Hügel and then compares the Baron’s positions with those Newman’s biographer, Wilfred Ward.

In their influential paper “The extended mind”, Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue for the possibility of the extended mind. Based on Clark and Chalmers’s views, Stephen Hetherington argues in his paper “The extended knower” that there are extended knowers, provided epistemic externalism holds. He also uses the argument and its conclusion to criticize Baron Reed’s scepticism in the paper “The long road to skepticism” : 236–262, 2007). In this chapter, I argue that both Hetherington’s notion of the extended (...) knower and his argument are problematic. This is because the conceptual intelligibility of his notion of the extended knower entails the highly counterintuitive consequence that, in some cases, some negative entities would have to be constitutive of the extended knower. I also show that Hetherington’s criticism of Reed’s scepticism is not successful, and that there is no reason to believe that Clark and Chalmers would hold that there is the extended knower in Hetherington’s sense. (shrink)

Decision analysis is a good example of an innovative method for consent. Baron seems to consider decision analysis to be a different way of thinking about consent (Baron 2006). There is a positivis...

Books reviewed:John Barton, Joel and Obadiah: A Commentary John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew, Volume III: Companions and CompetitorsWilliam E. Arnal, Jesus and the Village Scribes: Galilean Conflicts and the Setting of QRichard A. Horsley, Hearing the Whole Story: The Politics of Plot in Mark's GospelMaurice Casey, Aramaic Sources of Mark's GospelPhilip Jenkins, Hidden Gospels: How the Search for Jesus Lost its WayChristopher M. Tuckett, Christology and the New Testament: Jesus and His Earliest FollowersMarkus Bockmuehl, The Cambridge Companion to JesusShelly (...) Matthews, First Converts: Rich Pagan Women and the Rhetoric of Mission in Early Judaism and ChristianityStephen J. Davis, The Cult of Saint Thecla: A Tradition of Women's Piety in Late AntiquityJ. Nimmo Smith, A Christian's Guide to Greek Culture. The Pseudo‐Nonnus Commentaries on Sermons 4, 5, 39 and 43 by Gregory of Nazianzus: Introduction, Translation and Notes.David Thomas, Early Moslem Polemic Against Christianity: Abu Isa al‐Warraq's ‘Against the Incarnation’Thomas O'Loughlin, Celtic Theology: Humanity, World and God in Early Irish WritingsCaroline M. Baron and Jenny Stratford, The Church and Learning in Later Medieval Society: Essays in Honour of R. B. Dobson Owen Chadwick, The Early Reformation on the Continent Benson Bobrick, The Making of the English BiblePeter Marhall and Alec Ryrie, The Beginnings of English ProtestantismRobert Tittler, The Reformation and the Towns in England. Politics and Political Culture, c. 1540–1640Peter Marshall, Beliefs and the Dead in Reformation EnglandNicholas Tyacke, Aspects of English Protestantism, c.1530–1700John Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558–1689William Gibson, The Church of England 1688–1832: Unity and AccordWarwick Gould and Marjorie Reeves, Joachim of Fiore and the Myth of the Eternal Evangel in the Nineteenth and Twentieth CenturiesJames M. Byrne, God: Thoughts in an Age of Uncertainty Michael Palmer, The Question of God: An Introduction and SourcebookMichel René Barnes, The Power of God: ΔYNAMIΣ in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian TheologyThomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on VirtueStanley M. Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth‐Century Theology and PhilosophyDavid Toole, Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy, and ApocalypseJohn Sullivan, Catholic Education: Distinctive and InclusiveGeorge Dennis O'Brien, The Idea of a Catholic UniversityGunnar Skirbekk and Nils Gilje, A History of Western ThoughtEllen Wagner, Essays on Plato's PsychologyAnthony Kenny, Aquinas on BeingJame Daly, Deals and Ideals: Two Concepts of EnlightenmentManfred Kuehn, Kant: A BiographyP. Travis Kroeker and Bruce K. Ward, Remembering the End: Dostoevsky as Prophet to ModernityStephen Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, KierkegaardDavid Braybrooke, Natural Law ModernizedMaría Pía Lara, Rethinking EvilW. W. Meisner, Freud and PsychoanalysisJennifer Jackson, Truth, Trust and MedicineJeremy Sugarman and Daniel P. Sulmasy, Methods in Medical EthicsH. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. and Mark J. Cherry, Allocating Scarce Medical Resources: Roman Catholic PerspectivesMaura A. Ryan, The Ethics and Economics of Assisted Reproduction: The Cost of LongingMichael Walsh, Dictionary of Christian Biography. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AN EARLY ACCOUNT OF DAVID HUME In New Letters of David Hume, Professor Klibansky and Mossner lamented the "dearth of information on Hume's early development". Though some new facts and documents have emerged since 1954, the early period of Hume's life, to 1740, remains the most obscure. The account of Hume in 1740 presented below adds nothing to our knowledge of the evolution of Hume's philosophy, but it does (...) give us an interesting picture of the young philosopher in society, and it suggests that those traits of character which later earned him the title of "le bon David" were already in evidence. The sketch below stresses, as many of his friends and adversaries were later to do, the divergence between the detached scepticism of his writings and his amiable engagement in the social life of a company. And if we take seriously the report that Hume was left in charge of the domestic "oeconomy" in the family he was visiting at Richmond, we might see this as foreshadowing his solicitude over, and constant interest in, the management of his own household and financial affairs in later years. The account printed here is an extract from a letter by William Mure of Caldwell to his sister Agnes, 2 dated "Richmond June 5th 1740". Mure has long been recognized as one of Hume's most intimate friends: Hume himself summed up the relationship when he wrote, on Mure' s death in 1776, "The Baron was among the oldest and best Friends I had 3 in the World." The document published here constitutes the earliest concrete evidence of their friendship yet recovered, ante-dating Hume's first published letter to Mure by more than two years. It appears that the two men were spending the summer of 17 40 in or near London, and possibly both staying at the house of some mutual friend. Mure had at this time just finished his study of law at Edinburgh University, and would probably have been vacationing in 79 London eri route to Leyden, where he was to complete his legal training. Hume may have been in the capital preparing to see Book III of his A Treatise of Human Nature, "Of Morals", through the press: it was published in November 1740. This, and the first two books of the Treatise, which had been published in 1739, were presumably the writings which he discussed with the company at Richmond. We have been here now these ten days, and pass our time in a very agreeable way, we have our aountrey man Mr. Hume the author of the Metaphysical books 7 that you heard so much of last summer as a party in our retirement, he is a very sensible young fellow and extreamly curious in most parts of learning and how much soever he has shown himself a Sceptick upon subjects of speculation and enquiry, he is as far from it as any man with regard to the qualities of a well natured friendly disposition, and an honest heart which are no doubt of greater consequence to the intrinsick worth of a character than any abstract opinions whatever. As he is very communicative of all his knowledge we have a great deal from him in the way of dispute and argument, and not a little too in the way of plain information we reason upon every point with the greatest freedom, even his own books, (which we are working at at present) we canvass with ease, and attack him boldly whereever we can get the least hold of him, and question or contradict his most favourite notions; all this goes on with thè greatest good humour, and affords us entertainment both within doors, and in the feilds at our walks in this delightful country, which is the finest that one can possibly imagine, and has the preference by people that has travel'd throw most of Europe, to any they ever saw. We make use of our Philosopher too in another way less becoming the dignity of his Character, as- we 80 keep family within ourselves, he provides the necessaries of household (¡economy and manages all the affairs of house keeping. From these... (shrink)

Emotions shape the landscape of our mental and social lives. Like the “geological upheavals” a traveler might discover in a landscape where recently only a flat plane could be seen, they mark our lives as uneven, uncertain, and prone to reversal. Why and how? Is it because emotions are animal energies or impulses that have no connection with our thoughts, imaginings, and appraisals? In the passage from which my title is taken, Proust denies this, calling the emotions “geological upheavals of (...) thought.” In other words, what changes the Baron’s mind from a flat plane into a mountain range is not some subterranean jolt, but the thoughts he has about Charlie Morel, a person who has suddenly become central to his well-being, and whom he sees as inscrutable, undependable, and utterly beyond his control. It is these thoughts about value and importance that make his mind project outward like a mountain range, rather than sitting inert in self-satisfied ease. (shrink)

The cognitive science of religions’ By-Product Theory contends that much religious thought and behavior can be explained in terms of the cultural activation of maturationally natural cognitive systems. Those systems address fundamental problems of human survival, encompassing such capacities as hazard precautions, agency detection, language processing, and theory of mind. Across cultures they typically arise effortlessly and unconsciously during early childhood. They are not taught and appear independent of general intelligence. Theory of mind undergirds an instantaneous and automatic intuitive understanding (...) of minds, mental representations, and their implications for agents’ actions. By-Product theorists hypothesize about a social cognition content bias, holding that mentalizing capacities inform participants’ implicit understanding of religious representations of agents with counter-intuitive properties. That hypothesis, in combination with Baron-Cohen’s account of Autistic Spectrum Disorder in terms of diminished theory of mind capacities, suggests an impaired religious understanding hypothesis. It proposes that people with ASD have substantial limitations in intuitive understanding of and creative inferences from such representations. Norenzayan argues for a mind-blind atheism hypothesis, which asserts that the truth of these first two hypotheses suggests that people with ASD have an increased probability, compared to the general population, of being atheists. Numerous empirical studies have explored these three hypotheses’ merits. After carefully pondering distinctions between intuitive versus reflective mentalizing and between explicit versus implicit measures and affective versus cognitive measures of mentalizing, the available empirical evidence provides substantial support for the first two hypotheses and non-trivial support for the third. (shrink)

Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, mentions Niccolò Machiavelli by name in his extant works just a handful of times. That, however, he read him carefully and thoroughly time and again there can be no doubt, and it is also clear that he couches his argument both in his Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline and in his Spirit of Laws as an appropriation and critique of the work (...) of the predecessor whom he termed ‘this great man’. In this paper I explore the manner in which the Frenchman redeployed the arguments advanced by the Florentine for the purpose of refuting the latter's conclusions. ☆ In citing Machiavelli, I employ N. Machiavelli, Tutte le opere, ed. M. Martelli (Florence, 1971), and I refer to the divisions within each work provided by the author. To make my references to Machiavelli's Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio more precise, I sometimes also employ the paragraph enumeration added by the editors of N. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, tr. H. C. Mansfield and N. Tarcov (Chicago, 1996). In citing Montesquieu, wherever possible, I have employed the splendid new critical edition being produced by the Société Montesquieu: Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu, ed. J. Ehrard, C. Volpilhac-Auger, et al., 22 vols. (Oxford, 1998-), which I cite as VF. I cite Montesquieu, Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence (1734), ed. F. Weil and C. Courtney, as CR by chapter and, where appropriate, line from VF, ii, 89–285. I cite Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des lois (1757), as EL by part, book, chapter, and, where appropriate, page from Montesquieu, Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu, ed. R. Caillois, 2 vols. (Paris, 1949–51), ii, 225–995, and Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, Mes pensées as MP by number from Montesquieu, Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu, ed. A. Masson, 3 vols. (Paris, 1950–5), ii, 1–677. (shrink)